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1. Any diversity in the society must be accurately reflected in its
representatives.
2. We select decision makers to decide on our behalf, mostly ig-
norant of the exact options they will face.
3. We prefer election systems that are independent of the number
of agendas being discussed and the number of voters in the
society.
4. We should not assume distances between people’s views to
have the same properties as distances between people’s homes.
5. Election systems that incentivize voting are essential for the
survival of democracy.
6. Insisting on pairwise comparisons is usually incompatible with
voter turnout, for many formalizations of elections.
7. Irrationality is part of being human, but we should refrain from
institutionalizing irrationality.
8. In a world without uncertainty, intermediate representatives
are unnecessary.
9. Any discussion about social issues is based on some assump-
tions. Economists are simply more explicit about their axioms
than non-economists.
